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abide by their previous interpretations of Congressional provisions against discrimination. Three of the Justices, including the Chief Justice, dissented from the decision, but no reasons were given for their action.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—CONSTITUTIONAL AND CHARTER PROVISIONS—RIGHT OF WOMEN TO VOTE.—The constitution of the state prescribed the qualifications of the electors for all elections held to fill offices which the constitution itself provided for, and in all elections upon questions submitted to a vote pursuant to provisions of the constitution, to be that voters should be male citizens of the age of twenty-one. A charter was granted by the legislature to a municipality containing a provision which conferred upon women the right to vote in municipal elections. In a proceeding in *mandamus* to compel the commissioners to permit the plaintiff to vote, *held*, that the charter provision was constitutional and therefore the *mandamus* was granted. *State v. French*, (Ohio, 1917), 117 N. E. 173.

COOLEY in his CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th Ed. 99) says that, whenever the constitution has prescribed the qualifications of electors, they cannot be changed or added to by the legislature, or otherwise than by an amendment to the constitution. The description of those entitled to vote as required by the constitution excludes all others. *McCafferty v. Guyer*, 59 Pa. 109. An act conferring upon women the right to vote for school commissioners, when the constitution provided that male citizens should be electors, was held unconstitutional. *In the Matter of the Cancellation of the Name of Matilda Joslyn Gage*, 141 N. Y. 112. The contrary decisions follow the theory expressed by JONES, J., dissenting in the instant case, wherein he says, "if the majority opinion be followed, the Legislature of the state may confine the elective municipal franchise solely to women, or to others, as it may choose." But this does not follow, for the legislature cannot nullify the constitutional requirements; it cannot exclude those who have been given the right, but must include them, though it may enlarge the class. Those authorities that are in accord with the principal decision contend that the constitutional requirements are a description of those who shall not be excluded. The principle *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, in the interpretation of provisions of the constitution, must be applied with great caution, and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as to plainly imply the negative of what is omitted, will be considered as prohibiting the powers of the legislature. *Pine v. Commonwealth*, (Va. 1917), 93 S. E. 652. The Michigan court has taken both views. *Belles v. Burr*, 76 Mich. 1; *Coffin v. Election Commissioners of Detroit*, 97 Mich. 188. The constitution is to be looked to, not to ascertain whether a power has been conferred, but whether it has been taken away. The legislature is practically omnipotent in the matter of legislation, except in-so-far as it is restrained by the constitution, expressly or by necessary implication. It must be conceded that all persons can vote who possess the qualifications described in the constitution, but it does not follow that no others can vote. The instant case expresses the modern doctrines that the constitutional qualifications are not exclusive, but merely inclusive.